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Introduction 
John Dewey's Democracy and Education: An Introduc-
tion to the Philosophy of Education, was published in 1916. 
It is still the best-known work in philosophy of education by 
an American author, and has remained in print down to the 
present time. Democracy and Education differs from many 
texts in the philosophy of education in that it was not written 
merely as a philosophy to be "applied" to education. It was 
made possible in large part by Dewey's participation in the 
Laboratory School at the University of Chicago from 1896 
to 1904. Dewey's own experience with faculty and students 
at that school is the life of education for which Democracy 
and Education gives testimony. This is true as well for 
Dewey's shorter works on education written during and just 
after his involvement with the school, including School and 
Society, The Child and the Curriculum, and Moral Principles 
in Education. What is more, he was philosophy of education 
editor for Paul Monroe's Cyclopedia of Education and con-
tributed a total of 118 articles to the five volumes of that work, 
1911-1913. Reprinted in Dewey's Collected Works, these 
articles make up a total of 266 pages, sufficient for a volume 
in their own right. Looking at the articles alongside corre-
sponding subject matter in Democracy and Education, one 
sees numerous examples of verbatim and slightly revised 
accounts of the former in the latter. When Dewey sat down to 
write Democracy and Education, he was well prepared by 
the work at the Laboratory School, his short books that were 
influenced by that work, as well as his thinking, teaching, 
and writing on related topics such as ethics, social theory, 
and logic. 
Two other sources, less well known than his published 
works, but of value for what they show us of the origins of 
Dewey's philosophy of education, are stenographic records 
of two sets of lectures in philosophy of education, one in 
1896, the other in 1899. The first consists of twelve lectures, 
191 typewritten double-spaced pages (hereafter referred to 
as LI). These have no accompanying supplementary mate-
rial, such as exact dates of each lecture, bibliography, 
syllabus, or outline. They were probably given by Dewey as 
lectures in the Lecture-Study Department of the University 
Extension, and then sent to students registered in an 
extension course, as was done for other lectures. The 1896 
lectures have not been published. 
The second set (hereafter referred to as L2) was found in 
Grinnell College Library by Reginald Archambault, and pub-
lished in 1966. These lectures were given in a course in the 
Winter Quarter, 1899, beginning on January 3 and ending on 
March 24. This course is announced in the University of 
Chicago Register for 1898-1899. It is accompanied by a 
detailed Syllabus with an extensive bibliography. The course 
met three times a week: it consists of a total of 33 
lectures,making up 300 pages in its printed form. L2, then, is 
longer and more detailed than LI. Yet L2 is not just a longer 
version of L1. Dewey did not give a shorter and a longer 
version of the "same" course. While much of the same ground 
is covered in both sets of lectures, the organization changes 
from LI to L2 so that similar ideas are presented in different 
contexts. Dewey was thinking through the subject matter in 
each case while searching for different ways to make his ideas 
clear. Although Archambault's edition of the 1899 lectures 
has been available since 1966, it appears not to be well known; 
references to it appear very seldom in the literature on Dewey. 
We shall treat both LI and L2 as little-known works. (In ref-
erencing them we shall indicate each set, followed by the 
numbers of the lectures. Thus, LI, 3 refers to the 1896 
lectures, Lecture 3.) 
LI and L2 share much ground in common with Democ-
racy and Education. Yet they are both "less" and "more" than 
that work. They are less in that certain ideas that appear in 
the 1916 work do not appear in LI and L2. Some of these are 
also found in the Cyclopedia articles of 1911-1913. It is 
apparent that Dewey did a lot of thinking, teaching, and writ-
ing on educational theory between 1896 as preparation for 
Democracy and Education. At the same time, LI and L2 are 
more than Dewey's 1916 work in that certain details presented 
in the lectures do not appear in Democracy and Education or 
take a smaller role there. It is clear that many of these details 
are based on examples of ideas that were being tried out in 
the Laboratory School, along with the activities that made up 
the trying. In 1896, the year of LI, the school opened; and in 
1899, the year of L2, the school was in its fourth year. Thus 
in discussing philosophy of education, the work of the school 
was very much on Dewey's mind; and in the activities of the 
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school, his philosophy of education was at work. Dewey's 
illustrations of philosophical, sociological, and ethical ideas 
by specific educational examples embody his lectures with a 
kind of immediacy, a vibrant sense of the interrelationship of 
theory and action. We might say that his lectures are sus-
tained by particulars even as they are general; and that 
Democracy and Education, while not lacking in particulars, 
is largely concerned with the general perspective that gives 
them meaning. 
In this essay, we shall portray the relationship between 
L1 and L2 on one hand, and Democracy and Education on 
the other, in terms of three categories: (1) common ground 
shared by the lectures and the published work; (2) the most 
essential ways in which LI and L2 complement Democracy 
and Education-, and (3) the most essential ways in which 
Democracy and Education complements L1 and L2. 
Common Ground 
Dewey's idea that education is reconstruction of experi-
ence is perhaps the most striking element shared by the lec-
tures and the later work, although the idea is introduced in a 
different context in each. 
Dewey's definition of education ' 'as the process of the 
reconstruction of experience, giving it a more socialized value 
through the medium of increased individual efficiency" comes 
in LI , 2. In L2, the definition does not come until lecture 12, 
with a slight restating: "the medium of increased individual 
efficiency" is now "the medium of increase of control of 
experience." In Democracy and Education, the definition is 
introduced in Chapter VI, again somewhat recast to say that 
reconstruction of experience "adds to the meaning of experi-
ence, and . . . increases ability to direct the course of 
subsequent experience" (89-90). 
In LI , 2 Dewey divides the definition into two parts, and 
discusses (1) the process of education as process, and (2) the 
character or content of the process. Under (1) he points out 
that the definition identifies the process with the aim. In 
doing so, he distinguishes this kind of process with various 
positions that set up aims external to the process—e.g., pre-
paring for life in the future, or attaining a certain kind of moral 
character for the future. The definition that identifies process 
with aim, Dewey argues, refers to "the only learning which 
is really educative . . . the learning which emerges in and 
through the process of learning itself." Under (2) Dewey 
points out that the quality of the process comes in two inter-
related phases; one is social, the other is individual. The mean-
ing of experience, he says, is the "social side," while the agent 
of experience is the individual one. Then he argues that the 
two are "phases of one and the same process." By emphasiz-
ing the individual as agent in reconstructing experience, 
generic conception; (2) in terms of end or aim, increase of 
social value in experience is intended; (3) in terms of method, 
the aim is to bring experience more and more under the con-
trol of the individual. In discussing what is involved in the 
idea of reconstruction, Dewey here says that remaking "is 
just as good at one point as it is at any other." That is, it is not 
finished at any point, inasmuch as remaking is both the aim 
and the process, rather than preparation for some aim outside 
the process. In terms of subject matter, it is not formulated 
without respect for the child and then presented by lecture, 
teacher, or textbook. Rather, subject matter "consists simply 
in . . . bringing to consciousness the facts which are involved 
in the child as he is." In both LI and L2 Dewey emphasizes 
the idea that reconstruction is both aim and process, and that 
the psychological can realize its possibilities in what they 
mean for social life. In LI he introduces the definition rather 
abruptly, as if the remaining lectures are to be an elaboration 
of it; while in L2 he works up to it in eleven lectures, using 
the earlier lectures as a context for its emerging. In particu-
lar, in L2, 9 Dewey argues that, if we take seriously the idea 
that a philosophic conception of education must take into 
account both the psychological and sociological dimensions, 
then definitions of education which focus exclusively on one 
dimension are one-sided. In a progressive society, he says, 
we cannot treat the development of the harmonious powers 
of the individual without reference to adjustment of the indi-
vidual to social conditions. It is futile to adjust the individual 
to existing social conditions, inasmuch as they are changing. 
We must treat individuals as able to use intelligence to for-
mulate and solve problems as they arise. Thus individuals 
are to serve society, not as it now exists, but by taking into 
account the changes they intend to be part of the makeup of a 
society different from the one that now exists. 
In Democracy and Education, Dewey reaches his defi-
nition of education in the third part of Chapter VI, "Educa-
tion as Conservative and Progressive," after discussing two 
"conservative" conceptions of education: (1) Herbart's, which 
Dewey calls "education as formation," inasmuch as Herbart 
denies that education is a process of "unfolding" from within 
or a training of mental faculties; rather, presentations to the 
mind from without eventually constitute the mind. (2) The 
idea that education comes about through recapitulating cer-
tain cultural products from the past; this idea usually took 
some form of the "culture epoch theory." In contrasting these 
conceptions with the ideal of growth, Dewey holds that edu-
cation is a reorganizing or reconstituting of experience, lead-
ing him to a definition of education as reconstruction of ex-
perience that virtually echoes the definitions of LI and L2 
(Dewey, 1916, 88-89). As in L2, Dewey works gradually up 
to the definition, placing it at the conclusion of the sixth chap-
ter, which readies his readers for Chapter VII, "The Demo-
cratic Conception in Education." Later, he argues that 
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education as reconstruction is essential to vocational educa-
tion and to the reconstruction of philosophy, social ideals, 
and methods. 
Ways in Which LI and L2 Complement 
Democracy and Education 
The problem of correlation occupies Dewey's attention 
at length in LI and L2—in LI , lectures 5 and 6; in L2, lec-
tures 18-23. Dewey says the problem came about as an at-
tempt to relieve the over-crowding and congestion of sub-
jects that made it difficult for students to get an overall sense 
of what they were studying. The idea was to find ways of 
connecting the various studies with one another (LI, 5; cf. 
L2, 18). The danger, Dewey says, is that attempts to tie to-
gether various parts of the curriculum tend to be superficial; 
what is needed instead is an overhauling of the curriculum. 
It is not enough to accept the various independent parts 
of the curriculum and then attempt somehow to cross-refer-
ence them. Rather, there is a deeper problem: whether there 
is any organic unity in the material of experience that is used 
in instruction, "and whether there is a corresponding unity in 
the mental processes which apprehend and assimilate this 
material" (LI, 5). 
Dewey attacks the problem by distinguishing two aspects: 
(1) One regards the unity of subject matter. If there is a unity 
in experience, we must set out to discover it, and see how it is 
differentiated in the various subject matters. Or, "we must 
discover what the vital system of experience is and how each 
study operates like an organ of an organism to contribute its 
part to the whole" (LI, 5). (2) The other aspect is the prob-
lem of how the individual experiences the subject matter. In 
other words, if there is unity in experience, is there a corre-
sponding unity in the processes the individual uses in mak-
ing "the stuff of experience" his own? Put differently, there 
are two interconnected questions: the problem of what (that 
of subject matter), and the problem of how (that of method). 
In both LI and L2, Dewey points to two theories of cor-
relation that fail to recognize the interconnection. One is that 
of William Torrey Harris, who views correlation from the 
standpoint of subject matter, almost ignoring the process by 
which the learner approaches the subject matter. The other is 
the Herbartian viewpoint, which recognizes the importance 
of unity in the mental processes of individuals but does not 
see the need for unity of subject matter. 
The problem with Harris' view, Dewey argues, is that of 
isolating subject matter from the ways in which children come 
to relate to it. Dewey disputes the view that the mind first 
isolates subject matter and then relates to it in a logical pro-
cess (LI, 5). The problem with the Herbartian view is that it 
begins with a number of psychological states of conscious-
ness and then deals with the interaction of the independent 
"mental energies." While it seeks "psychological" connec-
tions between the mind and the subject matters of instruc-
tion, it takes the psychological states to be given in the nature 
of things, and acts as if they can then be applied to subject 
matters that exist independently of them (LI, 5; cf. L2, 19, 
23). Thus both points of view fail to take into account the 
way we get experience under control by establishing conti-
nuity between the means children actually possess at various 
points in their development and the subject matter which they 
can bring under their control. 
Dewey also discusses the culture epoch theory as an-
other attempt to correlate subject matters. According to this 
theory the individual in its own development reproduces the 
stages which the race has passed through in its development. 
The educational counterpart is that the materials for educa-
tion in each stage of child development are the products of 
the race in its corresponding stages. Followers of the theory 
tended to make the literature produced by the race the center 
of the curriculum. Dewey questions whether the fact that the 
race has passed through a certain kind of development means 
that children should pass through it as well. Dewey argues 
that, as later stages modify earlier ones rather than simply 
superimpose themselves upon them, there is not a quantita-
tive addition but some reconstruction of the earlier stages 
(L2, 20; cf. LI, 6). Inasmuch as we live in a "civilized" pe-
riod rather than a "primitive" one, has not the period in which 
we live given the earlier stages a different significance from 
what they had when they stood by themselves? The stand-
point of education, Dewey argues, "must be that of present 
life"; this means that the use we make of earlier conditions 
must not be for their own sake, "but for the sake of throwing 
light upon the present" (L2, 20). What is important is not 
"the absorption of the child in the earlier epochs," but that 
"the child get a sense of movement through and away from" 
them (L2, 20). He adds that we do not study earlier civiliza-
tions in order to reproduce them. 
Dewey thinks that the culture epoch theory inverts the 
true educational method. Instead of beginning with history 
and looking for corresponding stages in the individual, we 
should examine the stages of child development and look for 
historical material that is appropriate for the child's age. "It 
is not an account of any preconceived parallelism, but sim-
ply because the child has a certain interest and mental and 
moral need, that we use our intelligence and sense to find 
material that will satisfy that need" (L2, 20). 
Dewey objects to the Herbartians' tendency to take lit-
erature as the basis for correlation. To take literature in this 
way, Dewey insists, is "turning the thing upside down." Just 
because literature is "the highest expression of conscious 
experience," a "high interpretation" of ordinary experience, 
we cannot expect the child to begin with it. Rather, children 
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need to begin with their own experience, and from that move 
on to higher expressions of it, to make "literature" out of 
their own experience (L2, 20). 
More prominent also in LI and L2 than in Democracy 
and Education are "stages" of child development, which arose 
in the context of Dewey's discussion of correlation. In argu-
ing that Harris, the Herbartians and advocates of the culture 
epoch theory did not adequately take into account the "pow-
ers" of children at various stages of their development in re-
lation to the subject matters which they are able to compre-
hend at those stages, Dewey gives an account of the "typical 
stages in the organization of experience and the correspond-
ing educational epochs" (LI, 5). (1) "The child begins with 
an unconscious unity of experience, both on the social and 
individual side." This is to say that, at first, the child does not 
clearly distinguish himself from others. "Each experience . . 
. occupies his entire consciousness and forms his whole 
world." The educational problem is how to retain the child's 
"organic wholeness" and yet acknowledge the separate pieces 
as they emerge out of it (LI, 5). (2) In the second period of 
development the child begins to specialize, to differentiate 
ends which he is able to have in view. Gradually the child 
consciously chooses certain ends in preference to others; 
hence certain values emerge. Dewey points out that both spe-
cialization — the selecting and valuing of certain ends and 
activities—as well as interrelation—the need to adapt each 
end to other ends in ways that fit together—are going on (LI, 
5). (3) In the highest period of development, "specialization 
becomes a controlling principle in action" (LI, 15). 
Dewey portrays the three typical "epochs" of education 
that correspond to the three stages in development of experi-
ence. (1) The first is primary education, whose problem "is 
to present social life as a whole and in a rich orderly way to 
the child." The aim is not what the child learns in definite 
acquisitions so much as it is "in filling out, in an orderly way, 
of the child's own consciousness," thus building up "the 
social whole" (LI, 5). (2) The second is secondary educa-
tion, the period in which selection and specialized interests 
develop. From the social side, the child can use subject mat-
ters to understand their social use and "ethical import." From 
the psychological side the child can work with remoter ends 
than those in primary school, and can select and adjust means 
with respect to those ends. Thus specialized subjects, such as 
history, mathematics, and science can come to attention as 
the earlier unity of experience gets to be broken up as the 
child gains control of the methods of the various subjects. 
Correlation can be attained as the child uses each subject 
matter to throw light on the others as well as on various other 
dimensions of his experience that are not confined to the typi-
cal subject matters. Correlation, Dewey says, is found "on 
the side of function or use"; "on the side of the adaptation of 
any act or idea to help in the attainment of another idea, or to 
give an enlarged meaning of it" (LI, 5). (3) The third is higher 
education, in which the aim is "to get control of the methods 
of investigation and reflection in use in the various subjects 
independent of any immediate use of which these methods 
may be put" (LI, 5). 
In both LI and L2, Dewey spends much time discussing 
the curriculum from the standpoint of what he calls "con-
structive" activities, or the activities human beings under-
take in their everyday occupations. In LI , 7 the point of 
departure is the opposition between the study of nature and 
the study of humanity, or the dualism between nature and 
man. When the studies are opposed to one another, each suf-
fers from "an arbitrary isolation," which leads Dewey to a 
discussion of the relationship between the scientific branches 
of the curriculum and those classed as humanities—history 
and literature. 
Dewey then discusses ways in which each group of sub-
jects can be placed in relation to the other. Man's construc-
tive power, he says, is the beginning of the matter. This is 
significant, not just for physical life, but for moral and social 
life as well. The true meaning of adaptation to the environ-
ment is "adaptation of the environment to self, rather than 
literal adjustment of self to the environment." Thus human 
beings become conscious of the power of control, by subor-
dinating physical forces to themselves. Or, "man comes to 
consciousness of himself as an end," and the possibility of 
making other things a means to this end. "The greatest tool," 
Dewey says, "is the idea of tools" (LI, 7). 
Dewey then points out how science is the great instru-
ment in developing our constructive activity, and adds that 
"history is precisely that projection of the process of evolu-
tion upon the plane of consciousness" (LI, 7). Thus history 
is seen as an instrument for realizing social ends; it connects 
our constructive activities with the development of natural 
science. Literature is taken to be an expression of ways in 
which our "experiences have a value which goes beyond their 
momentary occurrence." It is "the expression of man's con-
sciousness of the more permanent and enduring values of his 
experience" (LI, 7). Literature is intimately connected with 
history; the latter "might be termed the literature which is 
authentic" (LI, 7). In this sense history is a species of litera-
ture. 
The fine arts, in terms of their mode of operation, their 
form, are constructive activities; as to their meaning, they 
belong to literature. "Any constructive activity becomes ar-
tistic as soon as it is operated, not for its own special or im-
mediate aim alone, but insofar as the one at work is capable 
of seeing, in what he is doing, the whole system of social 
purposes" (LI, 7; cf. L2, 3). Connections that Dewey sees 
between the natural sciences, history, literature, and the arts, 
portray the idea of relating, rather than separating, the vari-
ous subjects of the curriculum. The aim is to enable the one 
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who produces to feel himself "as a social organ, reflecting in 
his own work the life of the community in which he belongs 
and contributing to its elevation" (LI, 7). 
In the educational consideration of constructive activi-
ties, Dewey sees them as representing "the fundamental pro-
cesses and instruments through which society has made it-
self what it is, in the subordination of nature to human ends" 
(LI, 7). He thinks that sympathy — between those "who la-
bor with their hands and those who do not"—might be devel-
oped if everyone at sometime participated in some sort of 
productive labors. "Sympathy needs a common background 
sharing in common experience to be real and effective" (LI, 
7). Here we see why, in the Laboratory School, students and 
teachers shared in preparing meals and other everyday ac-
tivities. 
While there are numerous examples in LI of ideas that 
were tried out in the Laboratory School, lectures 7 and 8 can 
be read as the theory on which the first two chapters of School 
and Society are based. The examples of children's activities 
in shop, kitchen, and story-telling discussed there are antici-
pated in Dewey's characterizations of the relationships sought 
between constructive activities, science, literature, and his-
tory in the lectures. Dewey distinguishes between two forms 
of constructive activity. First is the kind which shapes mate-
rial directly, such as clay modeling, sand molding, whittling, 
and wood carving. This includes work with saws and planes 
on wood, sewing, and weaving. Second is the kind of activ-
ity which not only changes space relations, but also changes 
the nature of the materials, such as cooking. 
In addition to considering constructive activities as pro-
cesses, they may be considered in their social relationships, 
as in food, clothing, and shelter as fundamental social neces-
sities. The processes become more diversified with richer and 
more varied results. In performing these activities, Dewey 
says, the individual "gets organs for appreciation of the part 
which they play in life" (LI, 8). Dewey calls attention to the 
opportunities for studying science that constructive activi-
ties can provide. Such work calls attention to the nature of 
materials. Constructive activities can also be occasions for 
introducing elements of measurement, and so mathematics 
can be made explicit. Questions of shape, size, nature of 
materials, can lead to geography. Sewing and cooking are 
activities that naturally lead to the study of plants and ani-
mals as sources of fibers, and to measuring of materials and 
the chemical changes that come about in cooking. 
Dewey thinks the practical problem in history is to find 
ways to simplify the great mass of existing historical mate-
rial in order to bring it within reach of children. Or, "the prob-
lem of history is how to make it a means of present social life 
instead of a series of events which are past and gone" (LI, 8). 
A way to make this kind of connection between past and 
present, Dewey argues, is through children's constructive 
activities. To begin with the historical epoch of primitive men 
("existing civilization reduced to its lowest terms") the school 
can show something of the ways in which problems of ob-
taining food, clothing, and shelter can be presented in a rudi-
mentary form. The introduction of tools, contrasting the hard-
ships of primitive civilization with the life of today, helps 
children get a glimpse into the underlying forces that human 
experience has had to deal with. Thus history becomes an 
introduction to social life. "All history," Dewey thinks, 
"should be an indirect sociology" (LI, 8; cf. L2, 26). 
Another topic holding a prominent place in the lectures, 
but a minor one in Democracy and Education, is the place of 
images in learning. In LI , Dewey brings up the subject by 
saying that whenever something remains which is got from 
experience, then something has been learned (LI, 9). From 
the psychological side, building up of experience takes place 
through the image. If learning is a transition from non-real-
ization to realization, the image is the "exact corresponding 
of the transition." Being neither a state of ignorance nor a 
state of "complete wisdom," the image is the bridge from 
one to the other (LI, 9; L2, 33). We have experiences, and 
later we turn them into images—formulations of experiences 
already had. Out of the mass of what we have gone through, 
we select some portions and ignore others; thus we construct 
certain images by which we are led on to further experience. 
"The image, being the instrument through which the new 
experience is built up, must be regarded like any tool" (LI, 
9). Each image has its "motor fringe," its tendency to bring 
on change. A young child tends to do something when an 
image comes to him. An older child can hold onto a train of 
ideas before acting on them. This means that learning can be 
initiated and maintained when conditions are provided for 
forming and expanding images. "The moral effect," Dewey 
says, "comes through the fact that every image tends, sooner 
or later, to reflect itself in actual doing, because it is itself a 
partial doing, or forming coordination" (LI, 9). 
As the image is the medium of building new experience, 
Dewey says, "It is the sole and only instrument of learning." 
From the psychological side, teaching works on "the ques-
tion of what images are formed in the child's mind" (LI, 10). 
So far as learning is concerned, perception, memory, and logi-
cal thinking are various ways in which images are used: they 
are not distinct "faculties" of the mind. What are called fac-
ulties are concrete abilities to work in certain ways. They are 
"practical powers," so that when we say that someone is a 
good observer, we are saying that he has a practical power of 
observing, not that he possesses a faculty of observing (LI, 
10). 
An image is not a mechanical copy of an earlier experi-
ence, but "is a reproduction of that experience adapted to 
help get some new experience" (LI, 10). To develop an im-
age requires a reference to some end sought to which an im-
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age from the past may be useful. Dewey emphasizes the 
activity of an image; because it is a particular doing in a par-
ticular situation, one "cannot be formed excepting as the self 
has something to do." This in turn means that there must be 
"something to be got out through the doing" (LI, 10). Again, 
this is a reference to an end sought and to the idea that an 
image "is itself a partial doing." 
Ways in Which Democracy and Education 
Complements LI and L2 
One striking difference between LI and L2 and Democ-
racy and Education is that LI and L2 do not discuss explic-
itly the nature of philosophy of education, while the 1916 
work does. Of course, the subject is broached in both sets of 
lectures: In LI , 1 Dewey begins by saying that "the philoso-
phy of education has the problem of discovering what the 
value of education is in human experience"; and in L2, 1 he 
says that the purpose of the course is to state general prin-
ciples of education in philosophic form. Yet in neither LI nor 
L2 does he explicitly discuss the nature of philosophy of edu-
cation at length. In LI and L2 he is "doing" philosophy of 
education without telling us what he is doing. 
In Democracy and Education, Dewey does philosophy 
of education for 23 chapters and tells us what philosophy of 
education is in Chapter 24, i.e., he tells us what he had been 
doing for 23 chapters. We find his now-famous definition of 
philosophy "as the general theory of education," which had 
appeared in Paul Monroe's Cyclopedia of Education in 1913 
(Vol. IV, 699). In Democracy and Education Dewey makes 
explicit what he had been doing in LI and L2 by saying that 
"Philosophy is thinking what the known demands of us— 
what responsive attitude it exacts. It is an idea of what is 
possible, not a record of accomplished fact. Hence it is hypo-
thetical, like all thinking" (Democracy and Education, 381). 
In LI and L2 Dewey had been setting forth ideas of what is 
possible in education, as responses to what he thinks the 
known demanded of him. 
In the Cyclopedia article and in Democracy and Educa-
tion, Dewey related the history of philosophy to the origins 
of educational theory in the response of Plato to the claims of 
the Sophists that they could teach "virtue," the practical know-
how needed to conduct oneself in private and public life. 
Those responses were attempts to answer questions such as: 
What is the relationship of reason to conduct? What is 
virtue—a kind of knowledge, custom, or opinion? What is 
its relationship to change? If philosophy is to be related to 
living, Dewey argues, it must be something other than "specu-
lation"; "it must be animated by the conviction that its theory 
is a hypothesis that is realized only as experience is actually 
shaped in accord with it" (Cyclopedia, Vol. IV, 701). Dewey's 
point is that Athenian philosophy and educational theory had 
a common origin in social problems, that Athenian philoso-
phy and educational theory share the same problems. "Edu-
cation," Dewey writes in Democracy and Education, "is the 
laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete 
and are tested" (384). This is what he was working on in LI , 
L2, and Democracy and Education. And from 1896 to 1904 
the Laboratory School was a specific laboratory in which 
certain philosophic distinctions were tested. 
Certain topics discussed at length in LI and L2 are 
either given little attention or attended to as parts of different 
contexts in Democracy and Education. For example, the prob-
lem of correlation, treated at length in 1896 and 1899, is not 
found in the index of the 1916 work. The place of construc-
tive activities in schools, and their bridge to more formal sub-
ject matters, is hardly discussed in its own right in Democ-
racy and Education-, it is found in the context of play and 
work in the curriculum, labor and leisure, and intellectual 
and practical studies. Space devoted to Herbartian ideas and 
to the culture epoch theory in Democracy and Education is 
confined to the examples of the "conservative" role of these 
theories in the chapter, "Education as Conservative and Pro-
gressive." There Herbartianism is an example of "education 
as formation." In a telling description, Dewey says that, for 
Herbart, "The 'furniture' of the mind is the mind. Mind is 
wholly a matter of 'contents'" (82). The culture epoch theory 
is portrayed under the heading, "Education as an example of 
recapitulation and retrospection." His criticism of the reca-
pitulation theorists' emphasis on the study of literature ech-
oes that of LI and L2: "Literatures produced in the past are, 
so far as men are now in possession and use of them, a part of 
the present environment of individuals; but there is an enor-
mous difference between availing ourselves of them as present 
resources and taking them as standards and patterns in their 
retrospective character" (86). In Democracy and Education 
these two conservative theories are contrasted with, and con-
stitute the opportunity to introduce Dewey's definition of 
education as reconstruction of experience. 
Another obvious difference is in the attention given to 
the place of images in learning. As we have seen, Dewey 
discussed images at length in LI and L2, going so far as to 
say in LI , 10 that, as the image is the medium of building 
new experience, "it is the sole and only instrument of learn-
ing." Imagination continued to be important for expanding 
and enriching experience in Democracy and Education, but 
its discussion there makes up about three pages in the chap-
ter "Educational Values." There it comes under the heading, 
"The nature of realization or appreciation," where Dewey 
writes, "Only a personal response involving imagination can 
possibly procure realization even of pure 'facts.' The imagi-
nation is the medium of appreciation in any field" (276). 
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The appeal of Democracy and Education lies in the way 
in which Dewey shows how the ideas implied in a demo-
cratic society need to be tested in education. The appeal of 
LI and L2 lies in Dewey's casting those ideas at work in a 
living "embryonic society," the Laboratory School. 
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